Index > Course > 2021-02-22: Windows Authentication; Kerberos
Source summary peer-review is canceled, but now the “next module’s” discussion is more complicated to include some peer review thing.
A primary or impersonation token can be restricted via CreateRestrictedToken
. Processes using a restricted token are restricted.
A client makes a request to a service.
There are four levels of impersonation token:
Windows comes with some built-in accounts:
When a user logs off, their delegate tokens look like impersonation tokens, but still have all their powers - tokens aren’t cleared until reboot.
File servers have people logging in and out all the time.
With a meterpreter session, you can harvest these tokens and act as these users. No creds or hashes needed.
Services also have access control lists, which can be misconfigured.
Non-admins changing which binary the service runs is bad.
How do they communicate? There’s a communication port.
woah
The WinLogon Process presents the login screen. Creds go to the LSA, which returns an access token, which is used to create the new logged-in process.
LSA does a bunch of checks.
Kerberos provides authentication over an untrusted network.
There is:
The user asks the Authentication Server for a ticket-granting ticket. If the Auth server likes you, it returns a session key for the TGS and a ticket-granting-ticket (TGT).
The user asks the TGS for a ticket for the server/service/resource. The TGS returns a session key to use, and a ticket for the server/service/resource.
The user can use their new session key and ticket to talk to the server/service/resource, without ever passing logon creds to the server/service/resource.
Index > Course > 2021-02-22: Windows Authentication; Kerberos